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1. Introduction 
On the 1st of January 2016, following recommendations from the Irish Low Pay Commission, the Irish 
National Minimum Wage (NMW) increased from €8.65 to €9.15 per hour, an increase of 
approximately six percent. This far exceeded the 0.7 percent rise in average hourly earnings for the 
same period (Low Pay Commission, 2016).1 As such, employers of minimum wage workers 
experienced non-trivial changes to labour costs, making this a suitable setting for studying the effects 
of minimum wage increases on employment outcomes. Prior to this rate change, there was a period 
of nine years during which the minimum wage did not increase.2 This coincided with an economic 
downturn, with unemployment in Ireland reaching a peak of 15 percent in 2012. However, there was 
a strong return to economic growth from 2013 onwards and by 2016 the unemployment rate had 
fallen to below eight percent. The fact that the minimum wage remained stable for several years prior 
to the 2016 rate change is useful as it allows us to carry out tests to ensure that our estimates are 
capturing effects relating to the minimum wage change, as opposed to general diverging trends 
among minimum wage and higher paid workers.  
 
A priori, the expected employment effects of minimum wage changes depend on the structure of the 
labour market. In perfect competition, the wage elasticity of labour supply is infinite and workers earn 
their marginal product. In this setting, a binding minimum wage leads to a reduction in employment 
(Neumark and Wascher, 2008). It is important to note that this can happen in two ways, either at the 
extensive margin, with a reduction in the number of workers, and/or at the intensive margin, with a 
reduction in hours worked (Brown, 1999). However, under monopsony, the wage elasticity of labour 
supply is low and firms can use their market power to set wages below their perfectly competitive 
level. In this setting, there can be a decline in the firm’s profits without a reduction in employment. 
Manning (2003) argues that monopsony may be more relevant in modern labour markets, however 
the degree of market power can vary across industries (Bachmann and Frings, 2017). 
 
There exists a vast literature estimating the effect of minimum wage changes on employment. The 
results from this literature are often mixed. Recent studies which find no discernible employment 
effects include Dolton et al. (2015), Hirsch et al. (2015) and Baek and Park (2016). However, others 
find adverse employment effects (see, e.g., Neumark et al., 2004; Meer and West, 2015; Sabia et al., 
                                                          
1 The corresponding wage increases in the wholesale and retail and hospitality sectors, which typically have a 
high incidence of minimum wage employment, were 1.7 percent and 0.4 percent respectively. 
2 The previous national minimum wage had been in place since July 2007. There was a temporary reduction in 
this rate to €7.65 per hour from February to July 2011. 
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2012). Despite these conflicting results, the weight of evidence tends to indicate little to no 
employment effects, as outlined in recent literature surveys by Schmitt (2015) and Belman et al. 
(2015). Dickens et al. (2015) suggest that the reason the literature often finds no employment effects 
is because previous work did not focus on vulnerable groups. Part-time females are the focus of study 
for Dickens et al. (2015) and they find that the introduction and uprating of the minimum wage in the 
UK is associated with negative employment effects for this group. Other studies focus on young 
workers, with Liu et al. (2016) and Gorry and Jackson (2017) finding negative employment effects for 
young workers in the US.  
 
The literature on the impact of the minimum wage on hours worked is more limited than that relating 
to employment. Neumark & Wascher (2008) suggest that when reacting to changes in the minimum 
wage, employers may adjust the level of labour inputs by reducing the total number of hours worked 
across all minimum wage employees rather than making specific workers redundant. Metcalf (2008), 
citing oral evidence given to the UK Low Pay Commission by the British Retail Consortium and the 
Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), indicates that following an uprating of the 
minimum wage, managers look closely at potential hours adjustments to offset rising labour costs. 
Consistent with this, several studies find a reduction in hours of minimum wage and low paid workers 
as a result of the introduction and uprating of the minimum wage (see, e.g., Stewart and Swaffield, 
2008; Metcalf, 2008; Couch and Witttenburg, 2001; Neumark & Wascher, 2008; Belman et al., 2015; 
Neumark et al., 2004). However, others find little to no effect on hours worked (see, e.g., Zavodny, 
2000; Skedinger, 2015; Dolton et al., 2010). 
 
Given that responses to minimum wage increases may occur at both the intensive margin (hours 
worked) as well as the extensive margin (number of workers), we study both effects in this paper. In 
addition to looking at all minimum wage employees, we also focus on the sub-group of temporary 
contract workers. As noted by Dickens et al. (2015), certain vulnerable sub-groups may be more 
susceptible to adverse effects of minimum wage changes. Temporary contract workers may be 
particularly susceptible to cuts in hours and employment given their more precarious employment 
status, however this group has been overlooked to date in the minimum wage literature. While our 
results indicate that the 2016 increase in the minimum wage in Ireland did not lead to greater job loss 
among minimum wage workers, we find that average hours worked of minimum wage employees 
declined by approximately 0.5 hours per week. The effect for temporary contract workers was more 
pronounced, at approximately three hours per week. We also find an increase in part-time minimum 
wage employment following the rate change, coupled with a substantial decrease in involuntary part-
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time employment among minimum wage workers. This indicates that these workers were choosing to 
work part-time as opposed to simply not being able to find a full-time job. As such, while some of the 
hours reduction may be due to employers responding to increased labour costs, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that more individuals were choosing to work part-time due to the higher minimum 
wage.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data used in the study 
and outline our strategy for identifying minimum wage and non-minimum wage workers. Sections 3 
and 4 respectively analyse the impact on hours worked and the probability of job loss as a result of 
the 2016 minimum wage increase. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Data  
For our analysis we use data from the Irish Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). The QNHS 
data is collected continuously throughout the year and is the official data source for producing 
statistics relating to the labour force in Ireland. In addition to information relating to employment and 
labour force status, the dataset contains demographic and human capital related variables such as 
age, sex and education. However, there is no detailed information on a person’s income, which poses 
a challenge for this study as we aim to separate minimum wage from non-minimum wage workers. 
While exact income data is not included, the dataset does categorize individuals into wage deciles, 
based on monthly take home pay, and we know the bands (in euros) corresponding to each decile.3 
This enables us to distinguish individuals likely to be impacted by the NMW change both before and 
after its introduction, thereby allowing us to measure the impact of the increase in the NMW on the 
number of hours worked and the probability of job loss.  
In the QNHS, a person’s information can be captured directly from the person themselves or, 
alternatively, via another member of the household (known as a proxy response). However, proxy 
responses are not permitted for the income decile questions and this explains most of the missing 
information. There are 124,875 employees in 2015 and 2016, of which 89,810 do not have decile 
information. Over 70 percent of these missing cases are due to proxy responses. There are two 
questions relating to hours worked in the data. The first relates to the actual number of hours worked 
in the reference week. The second captures the usual number of hours worked on a weekly basis by 
the employee, which may be calculated as the average hours over the last four weeks. When 
evaluating how the increase in the minimum wage affected hours worked, it is more appropriate to 
                                                          
3 The income deciles are set by the CSO and are subject to revision.  
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evaluate the change in usual hours worked. However, in the data there is very little difference 
between the information contained in both questions and our results are robust to using actual hours 
instead of usual hours. In terms of the response rate for hours worked, over 96 percent of employees 
with decile data also have information on hours worked.  
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics relating to the characteristics of individuals with and without 
decile information for the years 2015 and 2016. While both groups are broadly similar, we observe 
some variation in those responding to the wage question by broad demographic characteristics. For 
example, males are more likely to be in the group with no decile data. We observe very little variation 
in these characteristics over time in both groups. Nonetheless, we account for both non-random 
selection as well as possible variation over time in the characteristics of our sample of employees. As 
noted by Bollinger et al. (2018), non-response in earnings surveys can be particularly prevalent in the 
tails of the earnings distribution, which is where our target group of minimum wage workers are likely 
to be located. In the presence of severe earnings nonresponse, selection models can be used to test 
the robustness of the results. For example, Bollinger and Hirsch (2013) use CPS data, which has a 30 
percent nonresponse rate, and verify the robustness of their results from a wage equation using a 
two-step Heckman (1979) procedure. In this paper we also implement a Heckman two-step model and 
show the results do not differ from our baseline results. Any possible variation within groups over time 
is accounted for by the inclusion of additional demographic covariates within our difference-in-
differences model. Given that these characteristics are quite stable over time, it is perhaps not 
surprising that our results are not overly sensitive to their inclusion. 
2.1 Identifying minimum wage and non-minimum wage workers 
When evaluating minimum wage changes, the group most affected by the change, i.e. the treatment 
group, are employees who were earning below the new minimum wage rate in the previous time 
period. For example, individuals earning below €9.15 per hour in 2015 would have had their hourly 
wage increased in order to comply with the 2016 minimum wage legislation. As such, in this paper 
when we refer to our treatment group of minimum wage workers, we are referring to those earning 
on or below the new (2016) minimum wage of €9.15 per hour.  
 
Using the information available in the QNHS, we identify minimum wage and non-minimum wage 
workers as follows. Let minincome and maxincome denote the lower and upper wage levels 
respectively of the individual’s wage decile.  For instance, in 2016, the fifth decile of monthly wages 
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ranges from €1,497 to €1,792.4 We calculate a variable called calcminwage which represents what the 
individual’s gross monthly income would be if they were on the minimum wage based on their usual 
hours of work, such that, calcminwage = (hoursworked x €9.15) x 4.3. For example, the monthly pay 
of an individual working 25 hours per week and earning the minimum wage would be 25*€9.15*4.3. 
Based on these variables, we know that an individual is not a minimum wage worker if minincome > 
calcminwage, i.e., if their lowest possible take home pay exceeds what their gross income would be if 
they were on the minimum wage given the number of hours that they work. Table 2 below shows 
some examples of individuals in the data who are categorized as non-minimum wage workers.  
 
To identify minimum wage workers, we compare an individual’s highest possible take home pay to 
what they would be earning (gross) if they were on the minimum wage.  We categorize an individual 
as a minimum wage worker if maxincome ≤ (calcminwage*1.1), i.e. if their maximum possible take 
home pay is less than or equal to what they would be earning (gross) if they were on the minimum 
wage. We introduce a degree of flexibility by adding 10% to calcminwage due to the fact that we are 
using a person’s maximum possible wage as a guide to their actual wage. Therefore, it is likely that 
individuals whose calcminwage just barely falls short of their maxincome are minimum wage workers 
and therefore should be included. Our categorisation of minimum wage workers is relatively strict 
given that we are using maxincome to identify their wage and it is likely that the actual take home pay 
of most workers will be lower than the maximum level in their decile.  
As an example, consider an individual working 25 hours in decile 2, which, in 2016, runs from €632 to 
€991. This person would have a maximum monthly take home pay of €991, which is then compared 
to €1081, i.e., the gross earnings of a worker employed for 25 hours on the minimum wage of €9.15 
per hour (+10%). In this case, the individual would be categorized as a minimum wage worker as their 
maximum monthly pay is approximately equal to the monthly income of a minimum wage worker 
given the number of hours that they work. Table 3 below shows some examples of individuals in the 
data who are categorized as minimum wage workers.  
Note that we are comparing take home pay (minincome and maxincome) with a hypothetical value of 
gross pay (calcminwage) based on the number of hours that a person works. This does not impact our 
identification of non-minimum wage workers other than strengthening our assertion that these 
workers are definitely not minimum wage workers, as their lowest possible take home pay exceeds 
their hypothetical gross minimum wage. For minimum wage workers, this is also not problematic. In 
general, the take home pay of minimum wage workers is close to or equal to their gross wage. For 
                                                          
4 This relates to monthly take-home pay. 
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example, a person on the minimum wage working 27 hours per week will have take home pay equal 
to their gross pay.5 There will be slight differences for hours above this, however, note again that we 
are using maxincome to identify these workers, most of which will have take home pay less than this 
level. Despite this, we may also capture some low paid individuals whose hourly wage slightly exceeds 
the minimum. However, there is evidence that workers whose wages lie just above the minimum 
experience negative employment and hours spillover effects as a result of minimum wages (see e.g., 
Neumark et al., 2004). 
Our identification of minimum wage workers is supported by the fact that individuals that we identify 
as minimum wage workers possess characteristics that have been shown in previous research to be 
associated with minimum wage employment.6 In Table 4, we show the results of a linear probability 
model where the dependent variable equals one if the person is identified as a minimum wage worker 
and zero if identified as a non-minimum wage worker. The results for all workers indicate that males, 
Irish nationals, older people, those with higher levels of education and those with children are less 
likely to be minimum wage workers. Individuals working in the accommodation and food or wholesale 
and retail services sectors and part-time workers are more likely to be minimum wage workers. We 
also report separate results by gender and show that the same patterns appear for both males and 
females.7  
In Table 5, we show the distribution of minimum wage and non-minimum wage workers by wage 
decile. It is clear that individuals in the treatment group (our minimum wage workers) are 
concentrated in low wage deciles, whereas individuals in the control group (our non-minimum wage 
workers) are concentrated in higher wage deciles. Note that virtually no minimum wage workers 
appear in deciles 9 and 10. As such, for our analysis, we exclude these two deciles to make the 
treatment and control group more comparable.8 
A limitation of our approach relates to the fact that of all employees with hours and decile information, 
there are approximately 10 percent that we cannot assign a minimum wage status as they do not meet 
                                                          
5 The yearly income of this person is (27*€9.15)*52=€12,846.60. Plugging this figure into the Deloitte tax 
calculator shows that a person on this wage has a gross income equal to their net income; 
http://services.deloitte.ie/tc/Results.aspx 
6 Maitre et al. (2016) analyse the characteristics of minimum wage workers in Ireland.  
7 While these results are useful in providing an overview of the characteristics associated with minimum wage 
employment, we should be conscious of potential collinearity between some of the variables which could affect 
the magnitude of the coefficients. For example, education, sector and part-time employment are likely to be 
correlated. In addition, while we control for a range of observable characteristics, there is likely to be 
unobservable traits, such as innate ability, that will also affect the probability of minimum wage employment.  
8 The results in the paper are not reliant on this exclusion.  
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our assignment criteria.9 Of the 10 percent of unassignable employees, we cannot identify minimum 
wage workers working very low (less than 15) hours due to the large width of the lowest wage decile. 
For example, a minimum wage employee working 10 usual hours per week at a minimum wage level 
of €9.15 per hour will have a monthly salary of €393.45. However, as this falls within the first decile, 
which ranges from 0 to €631, we cannot assign any minimum wage individuals working 10 hours to 
the treatment group as maxincome > (calcminwage*1.1). The problem persists for individuals working 
up to 14 hours per week, as the maximum qualifying criteria for identifying a minimum wage worker 
in this category also lies below the first decile upper range. We cannot simply assume that all first 
decile individuals working up to 15 hours per week are minimum wage workers as, for instance, an 
individual working 10 hours could earn €13 per hour and still fall within the first income decile. 
However, according to the Central Statistics Office Ireland (2017), this low hours group accounts for 
less than 20 percent of minimum wage workers in Ireland. Therefore, our analysis is reflective of 
approximately 80 percent of minimum wage workers.  
Finally, there may be concerns related to the fact that we use hours as a dependent variable and we 
also use hours as part of our allocation criteria for minimum wage status in order to generate our 
treatment dummy variable. However, while endogeneity concerns may exist in certain scenarios 
where the same variable enters both sides of the regression equation, this is not problematic for our 
allocation criteria. We are simply using hours to calculate what a person’s hypothetical minimum wage 
would be, which we then compare to their income decile. Consider an employee in decile 3 (€992-
€1280) working 32 hours per week. Given this person’s maximum possible wage is approximately 
equal to what they would be earning as a minimum wage worker, they are classified as a minimum 
wage worker (T=1). More precisely, their maxincome (€1280) < calcminwage (€1385). Note that hours 
can increase and this does not change their minimum wage status (T=1). In fact, if hours were 33 
instead of 32, then we are more certain that they are minimum wage workers. If, on the other hand, 
the hours for this type of person were to decrease to 30, then they are still a minimum wage worker 
as maxincome (€1280) < calcminwage (€1298). If they decreased further to, for example, 29 hours, 
then we can no longer assign this worker as they meet neither criteria due to minincome (€992) < 
calcminwage (€1255) < maxincome (€1280). This type of person would then be contained in the 10 
percent of unassignable individuals for which we cannot be sufficiently certain as to their status. 
However, note that they would simply drop from the analysis and it would not be the case that the 
hours change would simultaneously affect their minimum wage status and the dependent variable. 
For their minimum wage status to change to T=0, this type of person would have to see an hours 
                                                          
9 These are individuals where (minincome < calcminwage*1.1 < maxincome) 
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reduction from 32 hours to 22 hours per week with no corresponding decile change. However, in 
reality, decile and hours are not independent and a dramatic hours reduction is likely to coincide with 
a drop in income decile, which will, again, likely leave the treatment status unchanged at T=1. For 
example, if the hours drop to 25 and there is a corresponding movement from decile 3 to decile 2, 
then we are back at our initial assessment and the individual is still a minimum wage worker (T=1). 
3. Hours Worked 
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to estimate the effect of the national minimum wage 
change on hours worked. This involves calculating the change in hours worked for the treatment group 
(minimum wage workers) in the period following the policy change compared to the period preceding 
the policy change, and subtracting from this the change in hours worked of the control group (the 
non-minimum wage workers) over the same two periods. For example, if we observe a reduction in 
hours worked for the treatment group and a similar reduction in hours worked for the control group, 
then we cannot say that the minimum wage change caused the hours reduction in the treatment 
group, given that the control group (of non-minimum wage workers) experienced a similar reduction. 
If, on the other hand, we observe a reduction in hours worked for the treatment group and no 
reduction (or even an increase) in hours worked for the control group, then we attribute the decline 
in hours worked for the minimum wage workers to the minimum wage increase. For our analysis of 
hours worked, we pool yearly cross-sections of data, with each year containing a minimum wage and 
non-minimum wage group.  
The treatment effects can be estimated using standard linear regression techniques. With just two 
time periods, namely 2015 and 2016, the difference-in-differences estimator can be implemented 
with the following regression, 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (1) 
Where Hoursi,t are the usual hours worked of worker i in time t. Yeart is a dummy variable which equals 
one for observations in 2016 and zero for observations in 2015, Ti is a treatment dummy variable 
which equals one if worker i is a minimum wage worker and zero if a higher paid worker. The 
interaction term Yeart*Ti is the estimated treatment effect.10 We also include a vector of additional 
covariates, Xi,t, which includes age, education, gender and the number of children in the family. 
Including additional covariates in a difference-in-differences model controls for any potential 
                                                          
10 It is straightforward to show that 𝛽𝛽4 = [E(Hours | Year=2016, T=1) – E(Hours | Year=2015, T=1)] – [E(Hours | 
Year=2016, T=0) – E(Hours | Year=2015, T=0).  
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compositional changes within the treatment and control groups over time. Even if the treatment is 
independent of these covariates, it is common practice to include them in order to improve the 
precision of the difference-in-differences estimate.  
When multiple pre-treatment time periods exist, the standard difference-in-differences model 
(equation 1) is often augmented to include time fixed effects, as follows, 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝜏𝜏=𝑡𝑡2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (2) 
Where 𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏,𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable for period τ. The interaction term which gives the difference-in-
differences estimate, 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, interacts the post-treatment time dummy with the treatment 
dummy, as in equation (1). The key assumption underlying the difference-in-differences estimator is 
that of parallel trends between the treatment and control groups. In the absence of any policy change, 
the outcomes of the treatment and control group should display similar trends over time. As noted by 
Mora and Reggio (2015 & 2012), the type of specification shown in equation (2) implies the existence 
of equivalent pre-treatment trends for the treatment and control groups. It is common for researchers 
to carry out placebo tests in pre-treatment years, where no policy change occurred, in an attempt to 
verify the parallel trends assumption (see, e.g., De Jong et al., 2011). If one obtains a significant 
difference-in-differences estimate in a placebo year, then this indicates that the outcomes in the 
treatment and control groups were diverging even before the policy change occurred. In our analysis 
we include three pre-treatment years, 2013, 2014 and 2015.11 We find no statistically significant 
estimates in the placebo years, which supports the parallel trends assumption. An alternative to 
reporting results from several pre-treatment placebo years is to implement a test for common pre-
treatment dynamics in the pooled model, using a method proposed by Mora and Reggio (2015 & 
2012), henceforth referred to as the MR test. While a full exposition of the Mora and Reggio test is 
beyond the scope of this paper, the intuition behind the test is relatively straightforward. It is based 
on comparing the difference-in-differences estimate under the parallel trends assumption to other 
models which allow for the possibility of diverging pre-treatment dynamics among the treatment and 
control groups. In the presence of common pre-treatment dynamics, the estimates will not be 
statistically significantly different. We report the p-values from the MR test in our tables of results.12 
Again, all of the results are supportive of the parallel trends assumption.   
                                                          
11 We do not include 2011 as a pre-treatment year as there was a temporary reduction in the minimum wage in 
this year. Furthermore, Ireland was in a deep recession up until 2012. A period of economic recovery began in 
2013 thereby making the years from 2013 onwards more comparable. Nonetheless, our results are robust to 
including 2012 as a pre-treatment year.  
12 With a high p-value, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of common pre-treatment dynamics. 
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3.1 Hours worked results 
The results from our baseline specification are shown in the first two columns of Table 6. Equation (2) 
is estimated for all workers as well as for temporary contract workers only. The increase in the 
minimum wage is shown to have a negative and statistically significant effect on the hours worked of 
minimum wage workers in the order of 0.5 hours per week. The results for temporary contract 
workers are more pronounced, indicating that the increase in the minimum wage led to a weekly 
reduction of approximately 3 hours per week for minimum wage workers on temporary contracts. The 
other coefficients reveal that being male, older and having higher education is associated with greater 
hours worked, while each additional child in the household reduces the weekly hours worked of the 
individual by approximately 1 hour. The parallel trends assumption is supported by the MR-test, which 
indicates common pre-treatment dynamics. 
As our analysis is based on a sample of individuals for which wage decile data exists, we verify the 
robustness of our results using a Heckman Sample Selection Model. In the first stage regression, which 
models the probability that the individual is included in our sample, we use the following independent 
variables; gender, age, education, no. of children and nationality (Irish or non-Irish). As such, the first 
stage regression contains the same independent variables as our difference-in-differences model, 
along with the additional nationality variable. The results from the Heckman Model, shown in columns 
(3) and (4), are very similar to our baseline estimates.  
In our analysis, wage deciles are used to allocate individuals as minimum wage or non-minimum wage 
workers. The fact that these deciles can change over time could potentially bias our estimates. While 
the deciles remained largely unchanged during the main period of interest, 2015 and 2016, there were 
some minor changes, typically in the order of less than one percent, to the higher wage deciles in 
quarter 2 of 2016. For example, in 2015 and quarter 1 of 2016, the maximum wage in decile 6 was 
€2,130 per month. From quarter 2 to quarter 4 of 2016, this was slightly lower at €2,117 per month. 
To illustrate how this could impact our estimates, consider an employee in decile 6 working 49 hours 
per week. In 2016 their maxincome (€2,117) ≤ calcminwage*1.1 (€2,121), and therefore this person 
is classified as a minimum wage employee. However, in 2015, the maxincome (€2,130) just slightly 
exceeds the calculated minimum wage. As such, this person just falls short of meeting our allocation 
criteria. This means that in 2015 we cannot allocate employees in decile 6 working 49 hours per week 
as minimum wage employees, whereas we can in 2016. Therefore, decile changes in the pre- and post-
treatment period could potentially generate shifts in the hours distribution which are due to our 
allocation criteria and are unrelated to the minimum wage change. We verify that changes to wage 
deciles are not biasing our results by estimating our difference-in-differences model on the pre- and 
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post-treatment years, 2015 and 2016, and removing any worker whose decile-hours combination 
meant that they could not be allocated in both years.13 As such, we are ensuring that any change in 
the hours distribution is unrelated to the impact of changing wage deciles. The results from our 
difference-in-differences model using the adjusted hours distribution is shown in columns (5) and (6). 
The estimates are very similar to our baseline and Heckman specifications. Overall, there is a reduction 
of 0.6 hours per week, while the reduction for temporary workers is 2.8 hours per week.14  
The hours effect for temporary workers appears to drive the main result for the specification including 
all workers. Taking the adjusted hours model and excluding temporary workers yields a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient when no additional covariates are added. However, with the 
inclusion of additional control variables, the estimate loses statistical significance.15 Therefore, our 
results show some evidence, albeit weak, of a decrease in hours for all minimum wage employees. 
However, the evidence of a negative hours effect is stronger for minimum wage workers on temporary 
contracts. 
It should be noted that sub-minimum wage rates exist for certain categories of employees including 
those aged under 18, people with less than two years work experience or people who are in structured 
training during working hours. The sub-minimum rate for those aged under 18, for example, was €6.41 
in 2016, which amounts to 70 percent of the national minimum wage.16 However, the incidence of 
sub-minimum wage employment is very low. Of all individuals on or below the minimum wage, 
approximately 90 percent earn the minimum wage while just 10 percent earn a sub-minimum rate 
(CSO, 2017). Carrying out a separate analysis for sub-minimum wage workers is not currently possible 
as imposing such restrictions on an already limited sample size results in too few observations for any 
meaningful analysis. Moreover, the nature of our assignment mechanism to treatment and control 
groups, which is based on wage deciles, would limit our ability to precisely distinguish sub-minimum 
from minimum wage workers. As such, our treatment group of minimum wage workers may also 
include some sub-minimum wage workers. However, these workers were also subject to an increase 
in their hourly wage, similar to minimum wage workers, and may therefore face similar hours effects. 
While we cannot fully separate out sub-minimum wage workers, we carry out a robustness check 
which involves excluding under 18’s from the analysis. These workers account for approximately one 
                                                          
13 As the decile changes are small, there are just four hours-decile combinations for which we can allocate a 
worker in one year and not the other. These include the following: decile 4 – 35 hours, decile 6 – 49 hours, decile 
7 – 56 hours, decile 8 – 66 hours. Dropping these individuals reduces our sample size from 21966 to 21638 for 
the full sample and from 1339 to 1316 for the temporary contract workers subsample. 
14 The adjusted hours model results are also robust to a Heckman correction. 
15 The specification which excludes temporary workers and contains the additional control variables shows a 
decrease of 0.34 hours per week. However, the associated p-value is 0.28. 
16 For a detailed list of sub-minimum rates, see http://www.lowpaycommission.ie/Rates/ 
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quarter of sub-minimum wage earners (CSO, 2017). Our estimates in this age restricted specification 
remain unchanged in both their magnitude and statistical significance.17 
3.2 Part-time employment 
The detected fall in the number of hours worked among the treatment group can potentially be driven 
by at least two competing effects, (a) employers reducing the hours of individuals in receipt of the 
NMW in response to increased costs or (b) an increase in the proportion of individuals choosing to 
work part-time as a consequence of the higher rate of pay.18 While we cannot measure the competing 
strength of both effects, we can use our estimation approach to assess if the change in the NMW rate 
was associated with a higher increase in part-time employment among the treatment group and 
examine any change in the motives of individuals working part-time over the period.  
Table 7 shows the results of a difference-in-differences model using part-time employment as the 
dependent variable instead of hours worked. For brevity, we report the results from the adjusted 
hours distribution specification which we believe are the most reliable estimates as they rule out bias 
due to changes in wage deciles. However, as is the case with hours worked, our results are also robust 
to the baseline and Heckman Selection Models. While the dependent variable is a binary indicator of 
part-time status, we show results for a linear probability model, as the interaction term in nonlinear 
models, such as probit or logit models, are not interpretable in the same was as a standard linear 
regression, thereby making it difficult to interpret the difference-in-differences estimate (Karaca-
Mandic et al., 2012). The results indicate that the incidence of part-time employment increased by 
approximately 2 percentage points more in the treatment group compared to the control group 
following the increase in the NMW. The corresponding estimate for minimum wage workers on 
temporary contracts was 11 percentage points.19  
The QNHS data contains information on an individual’s motives for working part-time. One of those 
responses is that the individual is working part-time as they could not find a full-time job, which gives 
us an indication as to the incidence of involuntary part-time employment. If, as a result of the 
increased minimum wage, employers impose part-time hours on individuals who would otherwise 
choose to work full-time, then one may expect the incidence of involuntary part-time employment to 
                                                          
17 As they are virtually identical to our baseline results, for brevity we do not report these results in the paper. 
18 Specifically, the increased NMW rate will have met the reservation wage of individuals considering part-time 
employment.  
19 As with the hours model, the part-time model satisfies the parallel trends assumption. When placebo tests 
are run, we do not observe significant treatment effects. Likewise, when the baseline model is run, which 
includes all years of data, the MR-test is consistent with common pre-treatment dynamics. 
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increase following the minimum wage change. However, Table 8 indicates that the incidence of 
involuntary part-time work (could not find a full-time job) fell in both the control and treatment groups 
between 2015 and 2016. The magnitude of the decline was higher among minimum wage workers, 
falling from 45 percent in 2015 to 34 percent in 2016.  Therefore, we cannot discount the possibility 
that incentive effects, whereby more individuals were choosing to work part-time by virtue of the 
increase in the NMW, were a potential factor in explaining some of the reduction in average hours 
worked among minimum wage workers. 
4. Probability of Job Loss 
We also adopt a difference-in-differences approach to assess the impact of the minimum wage change 
on the probability that a minimum wage employee becomes unemployed or inactive. However, we 
cannot take the same approach as that used for hours, which compares outcomes among yearly cross-
sections of data. In order to evaluate job loss, we need to observe the same individual in two different 
time periods. Our approach involves following minimum wage workers over time to see if they 
experience job loss following the minimum wage increase. To do this, we exploit the longitudinal 
nature of the QNHS data to examine an individual’s employment status in the period immediately 
before and immediately after the minimum wage change. We measure the extent to which the relative 
rate of job loss among minimum wage workers, who were observed in the data in quarter 4 2015 
(before the NMW change) and again in quarter 1 of 2016 (after the NMW change), changed in the 
period following the increase in the NMW.20  
Our dependent variable is a job loss dummy variable which equals one if the individual was in 
employment in quarter 4 2015, just before the NMW change, and unemployed or inactive following 
the NMW change (in quarter 1 2016). It is likely that there will be seasonal effects from quarter 4 to 
quarter 1 which will impact low wage workers differently to high wage workers. For example, some 
low wage workers may be employed on short-term contracts to cover the Christmas period (quarter 
4) and will lose this job in January (quarter 1). Therefore, we cannot simply compare the rate of job 
loss of low wage workers with that of high wage workers as there may be seasonal differences which 
have nothing to do with the minimum wage. To overcome this seasonality, we again use a difference-
in-differences estimator; this time we compare the difference in job loss rates in Q4 2015 – Q1 2016 
between low and high wage workers, to the difference in job loss rates over the same period in the 
previous year, Q4 2014 – Q1 2015, when no minimum wage change occurred. For example, if we 
observe a high job loss rate among low wage workers relative to high wage workers for the treatment 
                                                          
20 It should be noted that this job loss could be either voluntary or involuntary. 
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period, Q4 2015 – Q1 2016, and observe similar sized differences for Q4 2014 – Q1 2015, then it is 
likely that this difference is due to seasonal effects as opposed to employment effects relating to the 
minimum wage. However, if the higher rate of job loss for low wage workers in Q1 2016 exceeds that 
of the previous period (Q1 2015) then this would indicate a causal employment effect relating to the 
minimum wage. We estimate this difference-in-differences model with the following regression, 
𝐽𝐽𝐻𝐻𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (3) 
Where JobLossi,t is a dummy variable which equals one if the individual was employed in quarter 4 and 
unemployed or inactive in quarter 1, and zero if employed in both periods. Wavet is a dummy variable 
which equals one for the period Q4 2015 to Q1 2016 and equals zero for the period Q4 2014 to Q1 
2015. The interaction between Wavet and Tit is the difference-in-differences estimate.  
4.1  Job loss results 
The results from our employment difference-in-differences model (equation 3) is shown in Table 9 
below. The results indicate that there was no negative job loss effects following the introduction of 
the minimum wage in January 2016. The patterns of job loss of minimum wage workers compared to 
higher paid workers after the minimum wage increase was similar to patterns in previous year where 
no minimum wage change occurred. We observe the same results if we extend our analysis to quarter 
2 of 2016. However, due to the fact that roughly 20 percent of households are replaced in each 
consecutive quarter of the survey, the sample sizes are too small to study beyond quarter 2. Therefore, 
our results are consistent with no negative employment effects up to six months following the 
increase in the minimum wage. However, the findings of Meer and West (2016), who use US data over 
the period 1975-2012, suggest that that the minimum wage will impact employment over time 
through changes in growth rather than an immediate drop in relative employment levels. This type of 
long run analysis is beyond the scope of the current paper and as such, we cannot discount the 
possibility of longer term employment effects. 
5. Conclusion 
This study assesses the impact of the increase in the minimum wage from €8.50 to €9.15 in 2016 on 
the hours worked, the incidence of part-time employment and the rate of job loss among minimum 
wage employees in Ireland. Our results indicate that the increase in the minimum wage rate resulted 
in an average reduction of approximately 0.5 hours per week among minimum wage workers, with a 
higher reduction, at approximately 3 hours per week, among those on temporary contracts. Further 
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examination of the data reveals that the incidence of involuntary part-time work (could not find a full-
time job) fell for both minimum wage and non-minimum wage workers between 2015 and 2016, with 
the overall magnitude of the decline being higher for minimum wage workers. Consequently, we 
cannot discount the possibility that incentive effects, whereby more individuals were choosing to work 
part-time by virtue of the increase in the NMW, were a factor in explaining the reduction in average 
hours worked among minimum wage workers. 
Our results also indicate that the increase in the minimum wage did not lead to an increased likelihood 
of minimum wage workers becoming unemployed or inactive. While the relative rate of job loss of 
minimum wage workers was higher than non-minimum wage workers, we observed a similar pattern 
and similar magnitudes when looking at previous years where no change occurred in the NMW. 
However, Meer and West (2016), who use US data over the period 1975-2012, suggest that that the 
minimum wage will impact employment over time through changes in growth rather than an 
immediate drop in relative employment levels. Therefore, while we detect no immediate effects, we 
cannot rule out the possibility of longer term employment effects relating to the MW change. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on employees with missing and complete decile data, 2015 & 2016 
 Decile data No decile data 
 2015 2016 2015 2016 
Age (in years) 41.6 
(n=17,587) 
41.7 
(n=17,208) 
40.1 
(n=47,595) 
39.9 
(n=42,215) 
Low education (%) 13.2 
(n=17,539) 
12.5 
(n=16,969) 
13.4 
(n=45,876) 
13.4 
(n=40,668) 
Medium education (%) 34.3 
(n=17,539) 
35.6 
(n=16,969) 
39.3 
(n=45,876) 
40.3 
(n=40,668) 
High education (%) 52.4 
(n=17,539) 
51.9 
(n=16,969) 
47.3 
(n=45,876) 
46.2 
(n=40,668) 
Male (%) 38.0 
(n=17,857) 
38.7 
(17,208) 
52.0 
(n=47,595) 
52.4 
(42,215) 
Usual hours 33.1 
(n=17,223) 
33.2 
(n=16,537) 
34.9 
(n=44,838) 
35.0 
(n=39,855) 
Part-time (%) 29.0 
(n=17,857) 
27.8 
(n=17,208) 
22.7 
(n=47,595) 
22.4 
(n=42,215) 
Source: QNHS 2015, 2016 
 
Table 2: Examples of individuals categorized as non-minimum wage workers 
Decile Hours worked minincome calcminwage Minimum wage 
worker 
7 (€2124 - €2431) 40 €2124 €1573.80 No  
5 (€1497 - €1792) 25 €1497 €983.63 No 
3 (€992 - €1280) 20 €992 €786.90 No 
 
 
Table 3: Examples of individuals categorized as minimum wage workers 
Decile Hours worked maxincome calcminwage 
(+10%) 
Minimum wage 
worker 
1 (€0 - €631) 15 €631 €649 Yes 
2 (€632 - €991) 30 €991 €1298 Yes 
4 (€1281 - €1496) 39 €1496 €1688 Yes 
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Table 4: Probability of being MW worker, 2015 and 2016 
VARIABLES All Males Females 
Male -0.054*** - - 
 (0.003) - - 
Age -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Medium education -0.105*** -0.064*** -0.151*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
High education -0.232*** -0.157*** -0.302*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Services 0.125*** 0.076*** 0.148*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
Part-time 0.035*** 0.122*** 0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) 
Children -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Irish -0.147*** -0.090*** -0.193*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 0.647*** 0.488*** 0.744*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 50,071 19,750 30,321 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Data is combined for the years 2015 and 2016. Services relates to accommodation / food and 
wholesale / retail 
 
Table 5: Distribution of MW and non-MW workers by decile (2015 and 2016) 
Decile MW non-MW 
1 17.12 0 
2 16.47 3.58 
3 20.39 6.51 
4 37.31 6.02 
5 4.85 6.92 
6 2.36 16.97 
7 1.23 19.14 
8 0.26 16.87 
9 0.02 14.5 
10 0 9.5 
Note: Data for 2015 and 2016 are pooled and the deciles are reported. 
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Table 6: Effect of the minimum wage increase on hours worked  
 Pooled model (2013-2016) Heckman Selection Model Adjusted Hours Distribution 
Model (2015-2016) 
VARIABLES (1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Temporary 
contract 
workers only 
(3) 
Full Sample 
(4) 
Temporary 
contract 
workers only 
(5) 
Full Sample 
(6) 
Temporary 
contract 
workers only 
Hours worked -0.52** -2.89*** -0.54** -2.51*** -0.63** -2.81** 
 (0.240) (0.977) (0.242) (0.979) (0.299) (1.21) 
T 2.28*** 4.20*** 2.22*** 4.03*** 2.23*** 4.27*** 
 (0.114) (0.441) (0.116) (0.444) (0.209) (0.833) 
Male 6.48*** 4.40*** 7.28*** 5.50*** 6.51*** 4.18*** 
 (0.082) (0.384) (0.261) (0.578) (0.128) (0.606) 
Age -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.214*** -0.11*** -0.074*** 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.005) (0.040) (0.006) (0.023) 
High education  2.27*** 5.36*** 1.99*** 2.05 2.46*** 6.09*** 
 (0.132) (0.651) (0.159) (1.35) (0.204) (0.980) 
Medium education 0.72*** 1.90*** 0.72*** 0.24 0.94*** 1.75* 
 (0.132) (0.653) (0.135) (0.896) (0.203) (0.984) 
No. of children -1.04*** -1.07*** -1.06*** -1.43*** -1.03*** -1.18*** 
 (0.038) (0.177) (0.039) (0.214) (0.058) (0.284) 
Constant 35.57*** 28.51*** 39.63*** 46.61*** 34.27*** 26.08*** 
 (0.241) (1.04) (1.26) (6.17) (0.366) (1.513) 
       
   Lambda  Lambda    
   -2.9 -8.3   
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
       
Common pre-
treatment dynamics  
(MR-test) 
Yes 
(P =0.54)  
Yes 
(P=0.47) 
Yes 
(P=0.77) 
Yes 
(P=0.28) 
N/A N/A 
       
Observations 49,650 3,224 49,650 3,224 21,638 1,316 
       
Notes: Data source is the Quarterly National Household Survey. The Mora and Reggio (2015) test is 
implemented using the Stata didq module. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 7: Effect of the minimum wage increase on part-time employment  
   
VARIABLES Full Sample Temporary 
contract 
workers only 
Part-time 0.023* 0.108** 
 (0.014) (0.055) 
T 0.023*** -0.038 
 (0.010) (0.037) 
Year -0.017*** 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.031) 
Male -0.221*** -0.116*** 
 (0.006) (0.027) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) 0.001 
High education  -0.162*** -0.319*** 
 (0.010) 0.044) 
Medium education -0.064*** -0.057 
 (0.010) (0.045) 
No. of children 0.059*** 0.056*** 
 (0.003) (0.013) 
Constant 0.195*** 0.458 
 (0.017) (0.068) 
   
Observations 21,631 1,315 
R-squared 0.1145 0.1282 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Reported reasons for working part-time 2015 / 2016  
MW workers Non-MW workers 
Reason 2015 2016 2015 2016 
Education / training 12.0 14.3 2.8 3.9 
Illness 1.7 0.7 1.8 1.4 
Caring for children 18.1 17.2 33.1 31.7 
Personal / family reasons 18.3 25.9 26.8 34.9 
Could not find FT job 45.3 34.4 26.5 20.0 
Other 4.5 7.5 8.9 8.2 
                               Source: QNHS 2015, 2016. Individuals report only one of the reasons listed above. 
 
 
 23 
 
Table 9: Effect of the minimum wage increase on the probability of becoming unemployed or 
inactive (Q4 2015 – Q1 2016) 
  
VARIABLES Q1 2016 
Job loss 0.01 
 (0.011) 
T 0.02** 
 (0.008) 
Year 0.00 
 (0.005) 
Male 0.01*** 
 (0.005) 
Age -0.001*** 
 (0.0002) 
High education  -0.01* 
 (0.006) 
Medium education 0.001 
 (0.008) 
No. of children 0.001 
 (0.002) 
Constant 0.041*** 
 (0.015) 
  
Observations 3375 
R-squared 0.0116 
 
